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CASE NOTES
enactments that the federal government should defer to states for
primary pollution enforcement.
PHILIP E. MURRAY, JR.
Antitrust Law—Environmental Law—Use of Antitrust Law as En-
vironmental Remedy for Suppression of Pollution Control
Technology—In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No.
31.'—Defendants, the automobile industry's "Big Four" and the
industry trade association, 2 participated in a joint research-and-
development effort aimed at solving the problem of automobile-
caused air pollution. 3 In 1953 the industry set up the Vehicle Com-
bustion Products Committee to facilitate joint research, and two
years later a cross-licensing agreement was added under which any
discoveries would be equally available to all participants. 4 After
industry critics charged that the joint effort was retarding, not
speeding, the anti-pollution effort, a federal grand jury was
convened. 5 The Justice Department subsequently filed a civil anti-
trust suit against defendants, 6 charging them with a violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act.' The complaint alleged that defend-
ants and other companies (named as co-conspirators but not as
defendants) had conspired to eliminate competition among them-
selves in the research, development, manufacture, installation and
publicity of air pollution control devices and in the purchase of
patents and patent rights covering such equipment. 8 The suit was
settled by a consent decree under which the defendants, without
admitting any illegal practices, agreed to cease any anticompetitive
activity. 9 In approving the decree, the district court denied the
1 S Trade Reg. Rep. (1973 Trade Cas.)1I 74,819, at 95,647 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 1973), on
remand from 481 F.2d 122 (9th Cir, 1973).
2
 The defendants were General Motors Corp., Chrysler Corp., American Motors Corp.,
Ford Motor Co. and the Automobile Manufacturers' Association, Inc.
3
 The concern over automobile emissions was intensified in 1950, when Dr. Arlie
Haagen-Smit, a California biochemist, discovered the link between automobile exhaust gases
and smog. Esposito, Vanishing Air 36 {1970) (the Nader task-force report on air pollution).
• Nader, Unsafe at Any Speed 154 (1965). See generally Green, The Closed Enterprise
System 254-63 (1972) (the Nader task-force report on antitrust enforcement); L. Jaffe & L.
Tribe, Environmental Protection 141-80 (1971).
5 Green, supra note 4, at 255.
• For a description of the complaint, see United States v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n,
[1961-1970 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. SI 45,069, at 52,705 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Complaint].
7 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). The section reads, in pertinent part: "Every contract, combina-
tion in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal .. . ."
e See Complaint, supra note 6, at 52,705.
9 United States v, Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 307 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal. 1969), affd
mem. sub nom, New York v. United States, 397 U.S. 248 (1970). The text of the decree is
reported in 1969 Trade Cas. SI 72,907, at 87,456. In substance it prohibited the defendants
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petitions of individuals, states, and local governments seeking to
intervene in the proceeding."
Plaintiffs subsequently filed civil antitrust actions, alleging that
they had suffered and were continuing to suffer damage as a result
of air pollution caused by vehicles manufactured by defendants that
would have been equipped with pollution control devices, but,
because of the conspiracy, had not been so equipped. The suits,
seeking treble damages under section 4," and injunctive relief under
section 16, 12
 of the Clayton Act, were filed by state and local
governments in their proprietary capacities for alleged damage to
government property, 13
 by states in their parens patriae capacities
for alleged damage to their general economies and environments,"
and by individuals representing classes including all farmers, all
persons sustaining damage from air pollution, and all persons living
in the United States. 15
 Equitable relief sought included a mandatory
injunction to force the defendants to install pollution control devices
on cars produced without them, and restitution to state and local
governments of money spent on the air pollution problem. The cases
were consolidated for pretrial proceedings in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Central District of California."
Defendants argued that the suits should be dismissed on the
from conspiring to restrain the development of pollution-control devices; from restraining the
individual decisions of companies as to when pollution-control devices would be installed;
from refusing to file individual statements with government agencies concerned with pollution
and from filing joint statements unless specifically requested to do so; from continuing the
cross-licensing agreement; from exchanging secret information on pollution control or patent
rights on devices; and from dealing jointly with independent developers of pollution-control
devices. Id. at 87,457-58.
United States v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 307 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal, 1969), affd
mem. sub nom. New York v. United States, 397 U.S. 248 (1970), noted in 5 Harv. Civ.
Rights-Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 408 (1970).
" 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
12 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970). The relief sought differed from the traditional prohibitive
injunction barring anticompetitive conduct, which had effectively been obtained by the
Government in its consent decree. See note 9 supra.
13
 The alleged damages included expenses incurred for repair of damaged property, and
for medical care in government medical facilities for persons suffering from pollution-caused
disease. Brief for Appellees at 6-7, In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31,
481 F.2d 122 (9th Cir. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellees].
14
 Appellees relied on Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (environ-
ment), and Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945) (general economy). Brief for
Appellees, supra note 13, at 7. After the suits were filed, the Supreme Court held that
damages to the general economy are not recoverable in a parens patriae action under the
antitrust laws. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972). For a discussion of a state's
standing to sue to protect its natural resources, see Note, 15 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 795
(1974).
13 See In re Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equip., 52 F.R.D. 398, 402-03 (C.D.
Cal. 1970).
16 In re Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equip., 311 F. Supp. 1349 (Jud. Panel
Mutt. Lit, 1970). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1970), "civil actions involving one or more common
questions of fact" that are pending in different districts "may be transferred to any district for
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings."
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grounds that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue under the Clayton Act.
The district court denied the motion to dismiss." Noting that "[i]n
terms of the development of the anti-trust laws, the concept of
source of injury alleged herein is rather new . . ," the court
nevertheless concluded that "[p]laintiffs may fail in their proof, but
until then, they should be given the benefit of employing 'any
available remedy to make good the wrong done.' " 18 However, of
the classes of individuals, only the class of farmers met the require-
ments of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." On
appea1, 2° the Ninth Circuit HELD: plaintiffs did not have standing
to sue for damages, but they did have standing to sue for equitable
relief. 2 ' In denying standing to sue for damages, the court of appeals
said that only the class of farmers had alleged damage to "commer-
cial interest," the only kind of damages recoverable under the
Clayton Act. 22 The farmers could not recover, however, because
they were not within the "target area" of the antitrust, conspiracy. 23
On remand, 24 the district court considered the availability of
equitable relief. Defendants argued that such equitable relief was
not available under the antitrust laws. The district court HELD:
equitable relief was not available because the damage suffered by
plaintiffs was not the result of a violation of the antitrust laws. 25
The court reasoned that the alleged conspiracy was "one addressed
not to the marketplace, but rather to joint tortfeasors refusing, or
delaying in, the abatement of an existing and continuing public
nuisance." 26 Smog was not a result of any anticompetitive activity
but rather the result of the competition between the defendants and
the resulting "monumental use" of the internal-combustion engine."
The court said that plaintiffs had proceeded under the wrong theory
17 In re Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equip., 52 F.R.D. 398 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
See Note, 12 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev, 686 (1971).
111 52 F.R.D. at 401.
19 Id, at 404. The court of appeals later directed the district court to re-examine the
propriety of the classes denied certification in light of the holding regarding standing to sue for
equitable relief. 481 F.2d at 132. On remand, the district court did not find it necessary to
reach the issue, denying plaintiffs the right to any relief under the antitrust laws.
2° The interlocutory appeal was taken under 18 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970).
21 In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 130-31 (9th
Cir. 1973).
22 Id. at 126. The Ninth Circuit followed the Supreme Court's decision in Hawaii v.
Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972), which was decided after the district court had ruled on
the question,
23 481 F.2d at 129.
24 In the district court, the remanded cases were consolidated with an equitable action
filed by eighteen states that had attempted to invoke the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court had declined to take jurisdiction, remitting the action to a district
court. Washington v. General Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109 (1972).
23 In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (1973
Trade Cas.) 11 74,819, at 95,647 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 1973). The ruling came after a pre-trial
hearing under Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 on the availability of equitable relief.
26 1973 Trade Cas. at 95,652.
27 Id. at 95,651.
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of recovery. "Assuming, without deciding, that such a conspiracy
(i.e. maintaining a nuisance) is unlawful, the redress for such unlaw-
ful conduct is not found in the antitrust laws." 28
This note will examine the decisions of the court of appeals,
and of the district court on remand, in light of antitrust precedents
and policy. It will first consider the alleged antitrust violation under
the "rule of reason" standard. Then assuming arguendo that a
violation was committed, it will consider the availability of damages
and equitable relief. Finally, it will consider the propriety of the
decisions in light of the proper role of the courts vis-à-vis the
legislature.
THE ALLEGED VIOLATION
The principal case (hereinafter referred to as Vehicle Air Pollu-
tion) is the first in which a joint research-and-development project
was challenged as violating the Sherman Act solely because of an
alleged reduction in competitive incentive. 29 The Act condemns
"[e]very contract, combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States . . . ." 3 ° At common law, contracts in restraint of trade were
considered illegal and unenforceable, although the law imposed no
other penalties. 31
 The Sherman Act extended the prohibition to
noncontractual arrangements, 32
 and provided for criminal penalties,
as well as civil remedies available to the government and to private
plaintiffs." While the bill was under consideration by the Senate,
Senator Sherman said:
This bill [seeks] only to prevent and control combinations
made with a view to prevent competition, or for the re-
straint of trade, or to increase the profits of the producer at
the cost of the consumer. It is the unlawful combination,
tested by the rules of common law and human experience,
that is aimed at by this bill, and not the lawful and useful
combination. . . .
I admit that it is difficult to define in legal language
the precise line between lawful and unlawful combina-
" Id. at 95,652. It should be noted that the court's suggested use of public nuisance
might pose some difficulties, at least to the extent that private plaintiffs are involved. See
Note, 15 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 795, 808 n.7$ (1974).
29
 Andrews, Antitrust Law Meets the Environmental Crisis—An Argument for Accom-
modation, 1 Ecology L.Q. 840, 849 (1971). See generally Currie, Cooperative Research and
the Antitrust Law, 36 j, Pat. Off. Soc'y 690 (1954); Marquis, Compatibility of Industrial Joint
Research Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 38 Temp. L.Q. 1 (1964); Turner, Patents, Antitrust
and Innovation, 28 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 151 (1966).
3°
 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
31
 Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 497 (1940) (dictum).
32 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
33
 Sherman Act, ch. 647, §§ 1, 2, 4, 7, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1,
2, 15, 25, 26 (1970).
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tions. This must be left for the courts to determine in each
particular case. All that we, as lawmakers, can do is to
declare general principles, and we can be assured that the
courts will apply them so as to carry out the meaning of the
law	 . 34
The Supreme Court has recognized the common law basis of "re-
straint of trade" as used in the Act," saying that the Act was aimed
at the same evil with which the common law was concerned: "the
dread of enhancement of prices and of other wrongs which it was
thought would flow from the undue limitation on competitive
conditions. "36
Although some practices, such as price-fixing, are illegal per
se, 31 in other cases the courts will apply the "rule of reason." 38 In
applying the rule of reason, the courts look to whether the conduct
has in fact lessened competition." To make that determination the
court must ordinarily consider
the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is
applied; its condition before and after the restraint was
imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or
probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to
exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the
purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.
This is not because a good intention will save an otherwise
objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowl-
edge of intent may help the court to interpet facts and to
predict consequences. 4 °
The initial question in considering whether the joint research
venture of the automobile manufacturers was illegal under the
Sherman Act is whether it would be considered a per se violation, or
whether it would be judged under the "rule of reason." If it were
considered a per se violation, then it would be illegal even if it
speeded the pace of pollution research, but under the "rule of
reason" it would be a violation only if it in fact reduced competition
in that area. The precedents suggest that such agreements are not
per se violations of the Sherman Act.
14 21 Cong, Rec. 2457, 2460 (1890).
15 Standard Oil Co. v. United•States, 221 U.S. 1, 55 (1911).
36 Id. at 58.
" See, e.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) (price fixing);
Timkin Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) (division of markets);
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (same). See generally Van
Cise, The Future of Per Se in Antitrust Law, 50 Va. L. Rev. 1165 (1964).
36 United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179 (1911); Standard Oil Co.
v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911).
16 United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607 (1972); Chicago Bd. of
Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
4° Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
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In the Gasoline Cracking Case,'" the Supreme Court considered
an arrangement between three oil companies to share patents relat-
ing to the process of "cracking" crude oil into gasoline. The govern-
ment charged that the arrangement violated the Sherman Act. Al-
though the Court found for the defendants, it noted that such
agreements "must be carefully examined in order to determine
whether violations of the Act result."'" The Court said: "[A]n
agreement for cross licensing . . . violates the Act only when used to
effect a monopoly, or to fix prices, or to impose an otherwise
unreasonable restraint upon interstate commerce."'" In a subsequent
case, United States v. Line Material Co.," the Court suggested in
dictum that joint research ventures, other than those used to effect
an otherwise per se violation, would be judged by a "rule of reason"
standard. In that case defendants' royalty-free cross-licensing
agreement was held to be a per se violation because it was used to
implement a price-fixing scheme. The Court went on to state:
The development of patents by separate corporations
or by cooperating units of an industry through an or-
ganized research group is a well known phenomenon.
However far advanced over the line inventor's experimen-
tation this method of seeking improvement in the practice
of the arts and sciences may be, there can be no objection,
on the score of illegality, either to the mere size of such a
group or the thoroughness of its research. 45
The legality of a patent arrangement such as the one involved in
Vehicle Air Pollution was summarized by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Cutter Laboratories, Inc. v. Lyophile-Cryochem Corp.: 46
Patent pools and cross-licensing agreements, when formed
in a legitimate manner for legitimate purposes, are not
illegal in themselves. . . . It is only where the agreements
are used to effect a restraint of trade or a monopoly that
they violate the law . . • . 47
In other situations in which patent pooling and cross-licensing
agreements have been held to violate the antitrust laws, they were
used to reduce competition" or to achieve a monopoly. 49
However laudable the purposes of a joint research venture
when begun, though, the effort may be attacked if it is suspected of
4 ' Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931).
42 Id. at 170.
43
 Id. at 173.
44 333 U.S. 287 (1948).
45
 Id. at 310.
46
 179 F.2d 80 (9th Cir. 1949).
47 Id. at 92.
48
 E.g., Zenith Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969).
49
 E.g., Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945).
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lessening competition and thus slowing the pace of innovation. An
example is the cross-licensing arrangement in the aircraft industry.
During World War I the government was concerned that it was not
getting enough airphines for the war effort because of a concentra-
tion of vital patents in a few companies. At the instigation of the
government an agreement was worked out under which the patents
would be more readily available to other companies, and the legality
of the arrangement was approved by the Attorney General." The
patent exchange, arrangement was renewed after the war and has
been in effect ever since. In 1972, however, the government filed
suit to end the arrangement on the grounds that it violated the
Sherman Act. 5 ' In its complaint, the government alleged that the
arrangement removed competitive incentive and thus inhibited in-
novation in the industry. 52
The application of the "rule of reason" to such ventures has
been strongly supported by some commentators 53 and it appears to
be the current attitude of the Antitrust Division of the Department
of Justice. In an address prepared for delivery on May 24, 1973,
Donald Baker, director of policy planning for the Division, said:
Patent pooling or interchange arrangements are not illegal
per se under the antitrust laws . . . . Rather, such pooling
arrangements will be looked at generally in terms of impact
on these twin antitrust values—competition in existing
markets and competitive innovation for tomorrow's
markets. 54
If the "rule of reason" were applied to joint industry anti-pollution
research, then such projects would be legal as long as they did not
reduce competition between the firms involved.
The argument for "reasonableness" is very strong in the field of
pollution control. The costs of pollution damage are economic "ex-
ternalities" or "external diseconomies," i.e., costs that are not im-
posed on either the manufacturer or the product user, but are
imposed on society as a whole." Because they are external to the
market structure, the market produces no incentive for their elimi-
SU 31 Op. Att'y Gen. 166 (1917). See Annot., 69 A.L.R. 300, 334 (1930).
51 United States v. Manufacturers Aircraft Ass'n, Civil No. 72-Civ. 1307 (S.ID.N.Y.,
filed March 29, 1972). See S Trade Reg. Rep. ¶ 45,072, at 53,464 (1973).
52 The suit charged that as a result of the patent-pooling and cross-licensing arrange-
ment, competition among the defendants in the research, development, manufacture and sale
of airplanes had been restricted and eliminated; competition in the purchase of airplane
patents and patentable inventions had been restricted and suppressed; and the research and
development of patentable inventions for airplanes had been hindered and delayed. 5 Trade
Reg. Rep. ¶ 45,072, at 53,464 (1973).
53
 See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 29.
54 5 Trade Reg. Rep. 11 50,173, at 55,311 (1973).
55 For a discussion of the economics of air pollution, see Lanzillotti & Blair, Some
Economic and Legal Aspects of the Pollution Problem—The Automobile: A Case in Point, 24
U. Fla. L. Rev. 399 (1972).
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nation. It is not competitively advantageous for a manufacturer to
be the first to develop and install pollution control devices, because
they increase the cost of his product without making the product
more attractive to consumers. An individual consumer has no incen-
tive to demand non-polluting products since although they are often
more expensive they do him little good unless most other consumers
also use them. In the case of automobiles, pollution control devices
have other drawbacks for producers and consumers: typically they
decrease performance and gas mileage. 56 Thus, the defendants in
Vehicle Air Pollution argued that there was no incentive for the
individual manufacturers to spend large amounts of money on their
own to develop pollution control equipment, and therefore the joint
venture was beneficial because it increased the amount of research
being done. 57
Plaintiffs contended, however, that the joint effort violated the
Sherman Act because it in fact lessened competition in the field of
pollution contro1. 58 Plaintiffs argued that there had been a
substantial incentive for the individual companies to engage in
pollution control research because of public awareness of the
problem, and because it was likely that as new technology was
develop?..d it would be required by law on all new cars." Thus a
manufacturer who made a "breakthrough" stood to gain a monopoly
position on patentable solutions to the pollution problem. Plaintiffs
characterized the joint effort as aimed at mitigating these strong
competitive incentives by ensuring that no company could profit at
the expense of the others by being first with a new device. 6°
Moreover, the plaintiffs alleged that defendants, as part of the
conspiracy, agreed to give misleading reports to the government and
the public concerning the feasibility of pollution control in order to
convey a false impression of the difficulty involved in solving the
problem." If such activities were proved, it would suggest that the
object of the cooperation was the suppression, not the development,
of pollution-control technology, and thus the cooperation was not
"reasonable" under the rule-of-reason test. Thus, the legality of the
56 1 F. Grad, Treatise on Environmental Law § 2.04, at 2-217 (1973).
57 See In re MUltidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (1973
Trade Cas.) ¶ 74,819, at 95,647, 95,651 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 1973); Brief for Appellees at 3-4,
In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122 (9th Cir. 1973)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellees]. In the General Motors Annual Report for 1969, the
company said: "The industry cooperative program did not delay progress toward finding
solutions to the difficult technological problems of motor vehicle air pollution. In fact, it
accelerated the progress which has been made." Quoted in L. Jaffe & L. Tribe, Environmen-
tal Protection 164 (1971).
56 Brief for Appellees, supra note 57, at 4.
59 Id.
6° Id.
61 See Kaufman, Suppressing Technology: The Automobile Air-Pollution Case, 3 Anti-
trust L. & Econ. 111, 124-25 (1970).
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arrangement was a question of fact, determinable only upon a trial
on the merits, which did not occur in this case.
THE REMEDIES
The Clayton Act provides for suits for treble damages by
anyone who is "injured in his business or property" by a violation of
the antitrust laws. 62 Equitable relief is available under the Act to
prevent "threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust
laws."63 In Vehicle Air Pollution the courts were faced with a
situation in which the "damage," although possibly falling within
the literal words of the statute, was of a type that was certainly not
contemplated by the Congress that passed it. In prior cases, the
"injury" involved was economic injury suffered as a result of
transactions in the marketplace. The plaintiff had lost profits
because of a competitive disadvantage, 64 for example, or had lost
money because of overcharges caused by price-fixing or a
monopolistic seller. 65 Vehicle Air Pollution presented a different
situation, however. The automobile manufacturers were allegedly
acting to avoid a diminution of profits that would have resulted
from the installation of pollution control devices, and in doing so
allegedly inflicted upon the community as a whole damages caused
by their polluting product. The damage from pollution does not
arise from a transaction in the marketplace; it does not result from a
commercial relationship between plaintiff and defendant. The
question presented to the courts was whether the antitrust laws were
broad enough to encompass such damage allegedly caused by an
antitrust conspiracy.
DAMAGES
Although on its face the Clayton Act seemingly provides for
recovery of treble damages by all those injured by an antitrust
violation, the courts have consistently limited the class of potential
plaintiffs who have standing to sue by judicially glossing the words
"injured in his business or property" and "by reason of an antitrust
violation" in section 4 of the Act. 66 Injury to "business or property"
has been held to mean only injury to "commercial interests."67 Of
41 15 U.S.C.	 15 (1970).
63
 15 U.S.C.	 26 (1970).
64 E.g., Zenith Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 118-19 (1969).
65 E.g., Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 395
(1906).
66 Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262-63 n.14 (1972); In re Multidistrict
Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 126-29 (9th Cir. 1973). See generally
Pollock, The "Injury" and "Causation" Elements of a Treble-Damage Antitrust Action, 57
Nw. U.L. Rev. 691 (1963); Timberlake, The Legal Injury Requirements and Proof of
Damages in Treble Damage Actions Under the Antitrust Laws, 30 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 231
(1961); Comment, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 570 (1964); Comment, 77 Dick. L. Rev. 73 (1972).
67
 Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 264 (1972),
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the plaintiffs in Vehicle Air Pollution, the court of appeals held that
only the class of farmers met this test." The gloss on "by reason of"
has taken two different forms. Some courts have held that a plaintiff
is not injured "by reason of" an antitrust violation if his injury is not
"direct," that is, if it results from injury to another who is more
"directly" harmed. 69 Other courts have formulated the "target area"
test, under which a plaintiff cannot recover if he is outside the area
of the economy deemed to be the "target area" of the conspiracy."
The application of the two theories has led to some confusion as
courts attempt to articulate the limitation on the class of potential
treble-damage plaintiffs. Decisions often blend the two theories, 7 I
and one circuit has found only a scant difference between them.'"
The Supreme Court has never directly ruled on the validity of these
judge-made limitations. Language in some decisions had suggested
that the Court might take a more liberal view of antitrust
standing, 73 but in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 74 the majority noted
with apparent approval: "The lower courts have been virtually
unanimous in concluding that Congress did not intend the antitrust
laws to provide a remedy in damages for all injuries that might
conceivably be traced to an antitrust violation." 75
The Ninth Circuit subscribes to the "target area" view, and it
denied standing to the farmers in Vehicle Air Pollution because they
were outside of the "target area," which the court described as the
area "concerned with research, development, manufacture,
installation and patenting of automotive air pollution control
devices." 76 The court did not discuss the novelty of the question of
" In re Multidistrict Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 126 (9th Cir. 1973).
69
 E.g., Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 434 F.2d 727, 732-34 (3d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971); Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A, Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383,
394-95 (6th Cir. 1962); Snow Crest Beverages v. Recipe Food, 147 F. Supp. 907, 909 (D.
Mass. 1956).
70
 E.g., Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Productions, 433 F.2d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 1970);
Hoopes v. Union Oil Co., 374 F.2d 480, 485 (9th Cir. 1967); Conference of Studio Unions v.
Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952). •
See, e.g., Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727, 730-31 (10th Cir. 1973);
Fields Productions, Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 318 F. Supp. 87, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aft d
mem., 432 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1970).
22
 Nationwide Auto Appraiser Serv. v. Association of C. & S. Co., 382 F.2d 925 (10th
Cir. 1967).
73
 E.g., Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961)
(per curiam), where the Court said:
Congress having thus prescribed the criteria of the prohibition, the courts may not
expand them. Therefore, to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under
[section 1 of the Sherman Act], allegations adequate to show a violation and, in a
private treble damage action, that plaintiff was damaged thereby are all the law
requires.
Id. at 660. See also Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 453-54 (1957);
Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948).
74 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
23 Id. at 262-63 n.14.
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allowing an action for damages caused by pollution under the
antitrust laws, but instead dealt with the problem in traditional
standing terms.
It is submitted that this analysis obscures the problem of
whether the antitrust laws should be available at all to redress
pollution-caused injuries arising from an anticompetitive conspir-
acy. Neither the "direct injury" nor the "target area" tests are
sufficient to answer this question. Pollution damage is always
"direct," that is, it is never derivative of injury to another, and the
"target area" limitation has little meaning when applied to
pollution-damaged plaintiffs. The "target area" has been described
as the "area of the economy which is endangered by a breakdown of
competitive conditions in a particular industry,"" or "the area
which it could reasonably be foreseen would be affected"" by the
violation. In the case of pollution damage, this would seem to be the
community as a whole.
A better analysis would have emphasized that the issue was
whether damages caused by pollution should be recoverable at all
under the antitrust laws. In view of the genesis of antitrust legisla-
tion, and its fundamental purpose as it has been articulated by the
courts, it is submitted that they should not be. In Hawaii the
Supreme Court held that such damages were limited to "commercial
interests."79 This holding should have barred recovery by the far-
mers as well as by the other plaintiffs in Vehicle Air Pollution,
because their damage, although to a "commercial interest," was not
really "commercial damage" at all because it did not result from any
commercial relationship with the defendants. In United States v.
Topco Associates, Inc., 80 the Supreme Court summarized the goal of
the antitrust laws:
Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in
particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They
are as important to the preservation of economic freedom
and our free enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the
protection of our fundamental personal freedoms. And the
freedom guaranteed each and every business, no matter
how small, is the freedom to compete . . 81
Pollution is not a balance-sheet item, and the remedy of treble
damages under the antitrust laws does not seem to be an appropriate
way to deal with it. The court of appeals should have denied the
farmers recovery not because of an application of the "target area"
test, but because pollution damage is not the kind of commercial
injury that the antitrust laws were enacted to redress.
77
 Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 55 (9th Cir. 1950.
71I
 Hoopes v. Union Oil Co., 374 F.2d 480, 485 (9th Cir. 1967).
79
 405 U.S, at 264.
405 U.S. 596 (1972).
sl Id. at 610.
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EQUITABLE RELIEF
Although it denied the plaintiffs in Vehicle Air Pollution stand-
ing to seek damages, the Ninth Circuit determined that the plaintiffs
did have standing to seek equitable relief. Noting that section 16 of
the Clayton Act does not contain the "injury to business or property"
language of section 4, the court held that plaintiffs had alleged
threatened loss or damage to "interests cognizable in equity," and
that was all that section 16 required of them." The court em-
phasized, however, that it did not reach the question of whether the
equitable relief requested by plaintiffs was available. 83 The district
court found that such equitable relief was not available," but the
opinion contains an important ambiguity. It is not clear whether
relief was denied because no antitrust violation was found, or be-
cause the kind of equitable relief requested was outside the scope of
the antitrust laws. If the former is the basis of the decision, it is
submitted that it is incorrect. The basis of the alleged violation has
already been discussed." In dismissing the claims, the district court
reasoned that the defendants had been "competing . . in the
manufacture of automobiles for sale to the American public,"" and
that smog was the result of this competition, because such competi-
tion increased the demand for, and thus the sales of, automobiles. 87
However, the fact that the companies involved were competing
against each other in general does not mean that they could not have
been engaged in anticompetitive conduct in the specific area of
pollution control. Plaintiffs sought to prOve that defendants con-
spired to eliminate competition in that one area in order that all
their profits would be enhanced. If proved, such collusion would be
an antitrust violation regardless of the fact that each manufacturer
was trying to outsell its rivals. When competing manufacturers
conspire to fix prices, for example, such conduct is illegal despite the
fact they continue to engage in kinds of competition other than price
competition. 88
 Plaintiffs also alleged that but for the defendants'
violation, cars would have been produced with pollution control
devices, and air pollution would have been lessened.
" 481 F.2d at 130. The court cited for this proposition Bratcher v. Akron Area Bd. of
Realtors, 381 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1967), where plaintiffs alleged an antitrust conspiracy by the
Board and others aimed at denying housing to Negroes and sought an injunction under § 16 to
end the conduct. The defendants argued that the antitrust laws were not intended to be used
as an instrument to enforce civil rights. The Department of Justice, as amicus curiae, argued
that the complaint did state a claim under the antitrust laws. However, the propriety of the
claim was not reached by the court, which deferred a decision until a further hearing on the
facts in the district court.
" 481 F.2d at 131.
84 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (1973 Trade Cas.) 11 74,819, at 95,652.
" See text at notes 29-59 supra.
86 1973 Trade Cas. at 95,651.
87 Id.
U See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 220 (1940); United States
v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927); Plymouth Dealers' Ass'n v. United States,
279 F.2d 128, 132 (9th Cir. 1960).
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The preferable rationale for the district court's decision is that
relief was denied because redress for a market externality like pollu-
tion damage is not available under the antitrust laws, whose func-
tion is exhausted when the market is restored to a competitive
condition. This function was fulfilled in Vehicle Air Pollution by the
government's consent decree. The district court noted that equitable
relief under section 16 has been granted "to undo what could have
been prevented" or "to cure the ill effects of the illegal conduct." 89
The court concluded, however, that in the entire history of the
antitrust laws, equitable relief has without exception been aimed at
the restoration of a competitive marketplace; 9° smog, therefore is
not "an evil the cure to which is found in section 16 of the Clayton
act."9 '
Section 16 of the Clayton Act reads, in part:
Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be
entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief, in any court
of the United States having jurisdiction over the parties,
against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the
antitrust laws, . . when and under the same conditions
and principles as injunctive relief against threatened con-
duct that will cause loss or damage is granted by courts of
equity, under the rules governing such proceedings . . . . 92
Vehicle Air Pollution presented a novel problem, differing from
the traditional situation where the damage to the plaintiff ceased
when the anticompetitive conduct was prevented or ended. In the
past, suits for injunctions under this section have been directed at
conduct as described in the statute. 93 In Vehicle Air Pollution,
however, plaintiffs sought affirmative action to redress the result of
the conduct, rather than to merely enjoin the prohibited conduct.
That the only function of the section is the cessation of conduct is
suggested by dicta in United States v. Oregon State Medical
Society," where a unanimous Supreme Court stated:
It will simplify the consideration of such cases as this
to keep in sight the target at which relief is aimed. The sole
function of an action for injunction is to forestall future
violations. . . . All it takes to make the cause of action for
relief by injunction is a real threat of future violation or a
contemporary violation of a nature likely to continue or
recur. This established, it adds nothing that the calendar of
years gone by might have been filled with transgressions.
89 1973 Trade Cas. at 95,649.
9° Id. at 95,652.
91 Id.
92 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970).
93 E.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969); Bergen
Drug Co. v. Parke, Davis & Co., 307 F.2d 725 (3d Cir, 1962).
" 343 U.S. 326 (1952),
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Even where relief is mandatory in form, it is to undo
existing conditions, because otherwise they are likely to
continue. 95
This view is also suggested by Zenith Corp. v. Hazeltine Research,
Inc., 96
 where the Court said that to make out a case for relief, the
plaintiff "need only demonstrate a significant threat of injury from
an impending violation of the antitrust laws or from a contemporary
violation likely to continue or recur."97
 The language of the section
itself supports this view, since it refers to relief from "threatened
conduct." The language of section 4 of the Sherman Act," describ-
ing the equitable jurisdiction of the federal courts in civil actions
brought by the government, lends further support to the view that
the equitable relief contemplated is only aimed at prohibiting future
conduct. That section reads in part:
The several district courts of the United States are
invested with jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations
of sections 1 to 7 of this title; and it shall be the duty of the
several United States attorneys, in their respective dis-
tricts, under the direction of the Attorney General, to insti-
tute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such
violations . . . . 99
This language suggests that the equitable remedy is aimed at halting
present, or preventing future, conduct. The legislative history of
section 16 indicates that its purpose was to give private plaintiffs the
same kind of injunctive relief that was available to the
government. too
The view that section 16 does not provide the type of relief
requested in Vehicle Air Pollution also finds support in the position
taken by the Supreme Court in Hawaii. Granting the affirmative
relief requested by plaintiffs in Vehicle Air Pollution might be
interpreted as sufficiently similar to pure monetary damages in its
impact on the defendants to justify the application of the limitation
on standing contained in section 4 to the claim for equitable relief.
95
 Id. at 333 (emphasis added).
96 395 U.S. 100 (1969).
97 Id. at 130.
98
 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1970).
99 Id.
'°° During the discussion of the bill the following exchange occurred:
Senator Nelson; I desire to call the attention of the Senator from Tennessee . . . to
the fact that under the original antitrust act of 1890 only the Government . . . can
obtain injunctive relief. By section [16] of this bill for the first time the same remedy
is given to private parties as was given to the Government . . . .
Senator Shields: Section [16] authorizes persons and corporations to bring suits in
equity against those violating the antitrust laws in all things, as section 4 authorizes
the Government to do so.
51 Cong. Rec. 14,214-15 (1914).
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Part of the prayer for relief requested the equitable remedy of
restitution, under which defendants would have had to reimburse
the plaintiffs for expenses plaintiffs had incurred in fighting the
pollution problem caused by the alleged conspiracy. 1 ° 1 The Supreme
Court has sometimes inferred the availability of such equitable
remedies in the context of a federal statute, 102 but there are counter-
vailing considerations in the antitrust laws. Under section 4 a limit
has been placed on the class of potential treble damage plaintiffs. In
Hawaii, the Court differentiated between suits for damages and
suits for an injunction on the basis that one injunction, barring the
anticompetitive conduct, would be as effective as 100, whereas there
was a danger of duplicative treble damage actions. 1 °3 If damages
were recoverable under a restitution theory it would circumvent the
restrictions placed on damage recoveries by section 4.
Mandatory injunctions, requiring affirmative action on the part
of the defendant, have issued under section 16. Such injunctions,
however, have been limited to undoing a violation, and thus ending
the anticompetitive conduct. This occurs when a company is or-
dered to divest a subsidiary acquired in a violation of the antitrust
laws.'" In Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 1°5 the Supreme Court
approved equitable relief that required, in addition to the divestiture
of a spark-plug company, that Ford purchase one-half of its re-
quirement of spark plugs from the divested plant for five years, and
that Ford protect the employees of the divested company by condi-
tioning the divestiture sale on the purchaser's assurance that it
would honor existing wage and pension plans and offer employment
to workers displaced by the shift.' 06 All these measures, however,
were aimed at establishing the divested plant as a viable competitor
in the industry, and thus undoing the anticompetitive effects of the
illegal merger. 107 In Vehicle Air Pollution, the anticompetitive con-
duct had already been barred by the government's consent decree,
so the traditional equitable relief had been exhausted. Thus the
affirmative relief requested by plaintiffs would have been a distinct
departure from antitrust precedent. As already noted, though, Vehi-
cle Air Pollution presented a novel situation. In the past, when the
anticompetitive conduct was ended, so was the damage to plaintiffs.
In this case, however, the damage—air pollution from cars un-
equipped with pollution control devices—continued despite the end
of the alleged conspiracy. Therefore the damage could be redressed
" 1 Memorandum of Plaintiffs on Equitable Relief at 25, In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air
Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (1973 Trade Cas.) 11 74,819, at 95,647.
1°2 Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967); Mitchell v. DeMario
Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960); United States v. Moore, 340 U.S. 616 (1951); Porter v.
Warner Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946).
1433 405 U.S. at 261,
ID4 E.g., Ford Motor Co, v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972),
1°5 405 U.S. 562 (1972),
"6 Id. at 572.
"7 Id. at 575.
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only by an order that would have compelled defendants to fit the
cars with pollution-control devices, as requested by the plaintiffs.
Rather than extending the law to grant relief, however, the district
court chose to take a more limited view of the antitrust laws.
There are several theories regarding the proper approach that a
court should take when faced with the prospect of applying a statute
to a situation that was clearly never contemplated by the legislature
that enacted it. 1 " Perhaps the most persuasive is the view that the
court should attempt. to decide whether the application will further
the policy that the legislature had in mind when it enacted the law
in question.'" In Vehicle Air Pollution the district court might have
allowed the requested equitable relief if it had determined that the
antitrust laws were aimed at redressing all harm inflicted on the
community by violations of the antitrust laws, and that anyone who
had suffered any injury had standing to sue. Instead, the court held
that antitrust laws were passed only to ensure a competitive situa-
tion in the marketplace and to protect those who are economically
damaged in their commercial relationship with violators.
In addition, a different decision would have raised grave ques-
tions about the proper role of the courts in the air pollution con-
troversy. Judicial recognition of the proper role of the courts
vis-à-vis the legislature is evident in City of Chicago v. General
Motors Corp.,"° a case stemming from the same facts as Vehicle Air
Pollution. In that case, the City of Chicago attempted to bring a
class action on behalf of its citizens to force the automobile com-
panies to "retrofit" used cars with pollution control devices. The suit
was based on the Illinois common law of products liability and was
brought in federal court as a diversity action. The district court
dismissed, holding that:
While the state and federal governments may not be mov-
ing as swiftly as plaintiff would like in this area, the fact
remains that legislative and administrative guidelines and
programs have been initiated. It would be improper for
this Court to exercise its equitable jurisdiction to interfere
with the comprehensive programs designed to solve a com-
plex social economic and technological problem."'
108 Compare Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation," 43 Harv. L. Rev. 886 (1930),
with Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 863 (1930). See also Horack, The
Disintegration of Statutory Construction, 24 Ind. L. J. 335 (1949); A Symposium on Statutory
Construction, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 365 (1950).
1119 See United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 26 (1948); Johnson v. Southern Pac. Co.,
196 U.S. I, 18 (1904).
110 332 F. Supp. 285 (N.D. III. 1971), aff'd, 467 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1972). The circuit
court noted that federal legislation has preempted the field of new-car emissions since 1968. As
for the cars produced before that date, the court held that the complaint failed to state a claim
under a strict liability theory, because the test of what is an unreasonably dangerous product
must be applied to each unit "and not to the gross effect of an indefinite conglomerate of
products manufactured by several manufacturers." 467 F.2d at 1267.
111 332 F. Supp. at 291.
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Because the automobiles produced by defendants were not
equipped with pollution control devices, they cost less, performed
better, and used less gasoline. To a resident of an area where the
pollution problem is minimal, these considerations would outweigh
the benefits of the devices. Retrofit ordered under section 16 would
ignore these regional differences. Under the Air Quality Act of
1967112 the federal government has preempted the regulation of
new-car emissions in every state but California.'" The states, how-
ever, retain the power to regulate the emissions from used cars.'"
Thus states where the pollution problem is greatest have the option
of requiring pollution control devices to be installed. Such measures
impose the cost of pollution control on the users of automobiles,
which does not seem inappropriate, since the cost would have been
borne by car users had the devices been installed in earlier years. A
decision for the plaintiffs in this case would have imposed the cost
on the automobile industry, which would then have passed it on to
future car buyers. Any proposed solution to the automobile pollution
problem involves a decision as to who will bear the cost. Congress
has considered legislation that would have required automobile
manufacturers to "retrofit" used cars with pollution control devices,
as well as a proposal that the government subsidize the retrofit (thus
distributing the cost to all taxpayers). Both proposals were
rejected.'" It is submitted that the decisions in Vehicle Air Pollu-
tion were correct in leaving to the legislative branch the decision of
where the burden of paying for pollution control should fall. 16
HARRY H. WISE III
Environmental Law—Admiralty Law—Validity of States' Oil
Pollution Sanctions—Askew v. American Waterways Operators,
Inc.'—Plaintiffs, merchant shippers, world shipping associations,
members of the Florida coastal barge and towing industry, and
owners and operators of oil terminal facilities and heavy industries
located in Florida, brought suit in the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida to enjoin application of the Florida
Oil Spill Prevention and Control Act (the Florida Act). 2 Officials
112
 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-571 (1970).
113 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6A(a) (1970).
114 See Comment, The Clean Air Amendments of 1970: Better Automotive Ideas from
Congress, 12 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 571, 597 (1971).
115 Id. at 598, citing S. Rep. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1970).
116
 Under the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Congress provided for mandatory licens-
ing of pollution-control equipment where there is a danger that one manufacturer might
achieve a monopoly because of its advancement in pollution-control technology. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1857h-6 (1970). Thus Congress provided an arrangement similar to the one attacked by the
Justice Department in Vehicle Air Pollution.
1 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
2 Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 376.011-.21 (Supp. 1972). 355 F. Supp. 1241 (M.D. Fla. 1971); see
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